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Empathic accuracy (EA)—the correct assessment of the affective states and thoughts of
a social partner—affects social behavior and the outcome of interpersonal interactions.
Growing evidence has shown that interpersonal power of a perceiver affects EA when
assessing a target. This picture, however, is not obvious; there is evidence supporting both
the idea that power can improve EA or impair it. Moreover, the mechanisms through which
high power individuals are more (or less) accurate at reading others’ minds are unknown.
The present article provides a new perspective on the power-EA link by investigating how
two core abilities involved in EA, mentalizing and mirroring, can explain when and how
power is related to EA. The inclusion of findings from neuroimaging studies on mentalizing
and mirroring adds a cognitive neuroscience perspective to the power-EA research that
has traditionally been conducted in a social psychological framework. The extent to which
a given EA-test requires mentalizing or mirroring and the way power affects both of them
could explain the contrasting findings. In addition, the analysis of the neural substrates of
mentalizing and mirroring may provide new insight into the relationship between power
and EA.
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INTRODUCTION
Power affects how people perceive their interaction partners (e.g.,
high power people perceive social interaction partners as a means
to an end) (Magee and Smith, 2013) and how they interact with
others (e.g., powerful people assert themselves by talking a lot
and interrupting others) (Schmid Mast, 2002; Hall et al., 2005).
In this contribution, we refer to power interpersonally, as the
degree to which an individual can exert control over another
person (Schmid Mast et al., 2009). We focus on the psycholog-
ical properties of power that can be evoked not only by a real
hierarchical relationship, but also simply through cues related to
power. Other definitions are sometimes used in the literature.
Structural power refers to the hierarchical differences in func-
tions or positions (Ellyson and Dovidio, 1985). Status is a group
acknowledgment of respect awarded to a specific individual or
can be the power derived from membership in a specific social
group (Sidanius et al., 2004). Dominance can reflect both an
enduring trait of personality (Ellyson and Dovidio, 1985) or a
more transient behavior related to the intention of seeking control
over others (Schmid Mast, 2002). Because our review focuses on
experimentally manipulated power and its effect on EA, the arti-
cles we cite define power in a similar way as we do (i.e., control
over other people).
Power does not only affect how others are perceived and acted
upon; it also affects the degree to which the assessment of a per-
ceiver is correct (Hall et al., under review). Correct assessment of
other people’s traits and states is called interpersonal sensitivity
or interpersonal accuracy (Hall and Bernieri, 2001; Schmid Mast
et al., 2012). One aspect of interpersonal sensitivity is empathy,
which has been defined as the ability of a perceiver to recognize,
understand, and share the emotions, intentions, and feelings of
a target (Zaki et al., 2009). Empathic accuracy (EA) is the corre-
spondence between perceiver’s judgments and target’s states and
feelings (Ickes, 1997; Zaki et al., 2009). In the present paper, we
investigate the link between power and EA.
Research shows that high power individuals are better at cor-
rectly assessing others’ emotions and thoughts (Schmid Mast
et al., 2009). However, this finding is not unequivocal in that
opposite effects have been documented as well (Galinsky et al.,
2006). A recentmeta-analysis (Hall et al., under review) revealed a
small (M r = 0.07) but significant effect showing that high power
individuals are more interpersonally accurate than low power
individuals. It is noteworthy that the way power was operational-
ized (i.e., dispositional trait, structural power, or experimentally
induced power) had no significant effect on this relationship.
The huge heterogeneity of the effect sizes extracted from the
literature suggests that there are moderators at work, affecting
the power-EA link. One such moderator might be the differ-
ent accuracy tests which require different skills or are sensitive
to different underlying cognitive processes. Interpersonal accu-
racy tests tend to correlate only weakly, if at all, with each other
(Hall, 2001; Zebrowitz, 2001), which corroborates the idea that
different tests might require different skills or cognitive processing
styles.
The mechanism through which power affects accurate inter-
personal perception is unknown. Previous studies found that
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powerful people are more prosocially oriented (Cote et al., 2011)
but also less motivated to be accurate (Stevens and Fiske, 2000)
and more socially distant (Magee and Smith, 2013). Schmid Mast
et al. (2009) showed that feeling respected and proud partially
explained the high power individuals’ greater EA. The meta-
analysis by Hall et al. (under review) showed that trait dominance
was related to more interpersonal accuracy when measured as
empathic/responsible compared to egoistic/aggressive. Another
trait aspect of power that might moderate the power-EA link
is the implicit need for power (nPower) (Winter, 1973), which
can influence the perceived saliency (Schultheiss and Hale, 2007;
Wang et al., 2011) and the motivational response (Schultheiss
et al., 2008) toward emotional faces. Since people high in
nPower are faster at recognizing emotions (Donhauser et al.,
under review), it is possible that nPower positively affects EA.
These examples of the potential mechanisms linking power to EA
do not provide a comprehensive explanation of the contrasting
findings mentioned above. This is why we propose a framework
that might tie together the results of previous studies.
Historically, two approaches have been put forward to explain
how we read other people’s minds (Goldman and Sripada, 2005).
The “theory-theory” explains mindreading as an extraction of
meaning from targets’ behavior, mental state, and context. The
“simulation theory” instead postulates that we understand others
through an internal simulation of their mental state. Although
these two approaches have been developed quite independently,
neuroimaging studies have shown that indeed EA involves two
different mechanisms, mentalizing, and mirroring (Zaki et al.,
2009) and in the present article, we aim to discuss their potential
role in relation to how power affects EA.
Mentalizing typically means extracting and understanding
another person’s goals by making inferences about his/her mind
state (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Spunt et al., 2011). It relies on
the ability to distinguish between one’s own mental perspec-
tive and that of others (i.e., theory of mind). Mentalizing skills
are often tested through false-belief paradigms where partici-
pants read short stories about two characters and need to make
inferences about others’ minds based on the knowledge avail-
able to other people. There is evidence (Lieberman, 2010) that
the different mentalizing tasks converge in that they all acti-
vate one specific brain area, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC). Other regions (e.g., the temporo-parietal junction and
the temporal pole) might be more contingent on task demands.
Mirroring typically means simulating the state of the other to
understand the content of his/her mind (Zaki and Ochsner,
2012). The rationale is that observing another person activates the
corresponding motor and mental representations in the observer,
enabling him/her to understand the other’s mind (i.e., neural res-
onance). Mirroring is supposed to rely on the mirror neuron
system, which was first discovered in the macaque brain (Gallese
et al., 1996). Although the existence of such a system in humans
is now quite commonly assumed, the topic is still debated (e.g.,
Kilner, 2011). According to Lieberman (2010), the mirror sys-
tem relies on the bilateral posterior ventrolateral PFC and bilateral
anterior inferior parietal lobule (IPL). Mirroring is considered a
rather automatic, unconscious response based on shared mental
representations whereas mentalizing is a rather cognitive aspect
of empathy that necessitates an explicit representation of the sub-
jectivity of the social interaction partner (Decety and Jackson,
2004). The two systems cooperate closely, because the mirror sys-
tem helps provide an early identification of the facial expressions
and the mentalizing system processes this input in order to make
causal attributions about emotions (Spunt and Lieberman, 2012).
Accuracy in assessing others’ emotions has been documented
to be related to both of the aforementioned brain systems: regions
within the mirror neuron system (i.e., the middle frontal gyrus
and the IPL) and areas involved in mentalizing (i.e., the superior
temporal sulcus andmedial PFC) (Zaki et al., 2009). To the extent
that the cues about a target’s feelings and thoughts become multi-
modal and dynamic, concurrent activation of both systems might
be crucial (Zaki et al., 2009).
In the present article we propose a new perspective on the rela-
tionship between power and EA by bringing together two strands
of research that have so far been relatively unconnected: the study
of power and interpersonal accuracy from a social psychologi-
cal point of view and the study of EA and its neural bases from
the cognitive neuroscience approach. In particular we argue (i)
that different EA tasks might require predominantly mirroring or
mentalizing skills, (ii) that power might influence both mentaliz-
ing and mirroring, and (iii) that power might affect the flexibility
to switch between mentalizing and mirroring skills.
HOWMIRRORING ANDMENTALIZING MAY BE DIFFERENTLY
INVOLVED IN EA TASKS: A HYPOTHESIS
Different EA tasks may require a perceiver to infer emotions of
others, guess what they are thinking, and understand what their
intentions andmotives are, among others. Mirroring andmental-
izing may differently affect each of these aspects. In this section,
we illustrate how the tasks used in the studies assessing EA of high
and low power people may require mentalizing or mirroring skills
(see Table 1 for a summary of the studies on this topic).
Some studies used simple recognition of facial expression of
emotions to assess EA. This is a very simplistic measure of EA
that might not take into account its entire complexity. Simple
expression recognition might rely more on mirroring than on
mentalizing. Indeed, a number of studies (Dimberg et al., 2000;
Hess and Blairy, 2001) found that when participants are presented
with pictures of emotional expressions, a facial mimicry response,
which is supposed to rely on the mirroring system (Catmur et al.,
2008; Heyes, 2011), is automatically elicited. Mentalizing might
be less critical than mirroring for facial expression recognition.
Even though contrasting findings have been reported (Uljarevic
and Hamilton, 2013), some studies showed that children with
autism can recognize facial expressions as accurately as typically
developing children (Castelli, 2005; Rosset et al., 2008). Autistic
children typically have impaired mentalizing skills and the fact
that they are able to correctly recognize others’ emotions sug-
gests that mentalizing may not play a crucial role in emotion
recognition.
In studies in which participants are tested in real-time face-
to-face interaction settings, one interaction partner infers the
other’s feelings during the interaction. Even though this is per-
haps a more naturalistic way of testing social variables, there is no
control of the mimicry response of participants and therefore of
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Table 1 | An overview of the studies investigating the relationship between power and EA.
Study Power Setting EA-related assessment Main findings
Manipulation Groups Task Main skills
involved
Anderson and Berdahl
(2002)—Study 1
Role play High vs. low
power
Face-to-face
interaction
Difference between two
people’s ratings
Mirroring +
Mentalizing
No significant results
Anderson and Berdahl
(2002)—Study 2
Role play High vs. low
power
Face-to-face
interaction
Difference between two
people’s ratings
Mirroring +
Mentalizing
Power improves the
detection of partners’
signals
Boucher et al.
(2008)—Study 1
Role play High vs. low
power
Face-to-face
interaction
Difference between two
people’s ratings
Mirroring +
Mentalizing
No significant results
Cote et al.
(2011)—Study 2
Role play High vs. low
power
Computer-
based
Rating of videotaped
interactions
Mirroring +
Mentalizing
No significant results
Galinsky et al.
(2006)—Study 1
Priming (recalling
of autobiographical
events)
High vs. low
power
Computer-
based
Perspective taking (draw an
E on the forehead)
Mentalizing Power decreases
perspective taking
Galinsky et al.
(2006)—Study 2
Priming (recalling
of autobiographical
events)
High vs. low
power
Computer-
based
Consideration of
communication intentions
Mentalizing Power decreases
perspective taking
Galinsky et al.
(2006)—Study 3
Priming (recalling
of autobiographical
events)
High power vs.
control
Computer-
based
Emotion recognition
(DANVA-2)
Mirroring Power decreases
emotion recognition
Gonzaga et al.
(2008)—men
Role play High, low, and
equal power
Face-to-face
interaction
Correlation between two
people’s ratings
Mirroring +
Mentalizing
No significant results
Gonzaga et al.
(2008)—women
Role play High, low, and
equal power
Face-to-face
interaction
Correlation between two
people’s ratings
Mirroring +
Mentalizing
Power decreases EA
Hall et al. (2006) Role play High vs. low
power
Face-to-face
interaction
Decoding non-verbal
messages
Mirroring Power decreases the
ability to read partners’
signals (due to
subordinates’ message
ambiguity)
Kunstman and Maner
(2011)—study 4
Role play High vs. low
power
Face-to-face
interaction
Difference between two
people’s ratings
Mirroring +
Mentalizing
Power improves EA
Schmid Mast et al.
(2009)—Study 1
Role play High vs. low
power
Computer-
based
Rating of videotaped
interactions
Mirroring +
Mentalizing
Power improves EA
Schmid Mast et al.
(2009)—Study 2
Priming (Word
completion task)
High and low
power, control
Computer-
based
Rating of videotaped
interactions
Mirroring +
Mentalizing
Power improves EA
Schmid Mast et al.
(2009)—Study 3
Priming (recalling
of autobiographical
events)
High and low
power, control
Computer-
based
Emotion recognition
(DANVA-2)
Mirroring Power improves emotion
recognition
Snodgrass (1985) Role play High vs. low
power
Face-to-face
interaction
Correlation between two
people’s ratings
Mirroring +
Mentalizing
Power decreases EA
Snodgrass (1992) Role play High vs. low
power
Face-to-face
interaction
Correlation between two
people’s ratings
Mirroring +
Mentalizing
No significant results
In the power section, we list how power was manipulated. Role play means the assignment of a participant to a high or low power role in an interaction with a social
partner. Priming refers to an implicit manipulation by means of exposure to social cues related to power. In the EA-related assessment section we describe how the
components that might influence EA were measured. The setting reports whether EA assessment relied on a face-to-face live interaction or on a computer-based
task (e.g., recognition of pictures of emotional expression). In the following column we describe the measure that was used to assess perceivers’ behavior. For each
study, we report which skills (i.e., mentalizing and/or mirroring) we hypothesize to be predominantly involved in the task that was used. In the last column we report
the main finding of the study.
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the involvement of the mirroring system. The mimicry response
is contingent upon situational factors (e.g., attitudes toward the
social target, type of social interaction) and can influence both
EA and perceived power. For instance, competitive interactions
decrease themimicry response (Lanzetta and Englis, 1989;Weyers
et al., 2009). This could be relevant because hierarchical interac-
tions might be competitive and the inhibition of facial mimicry
can in turn impair emotion recognition (Oberman et al., 2007).
Moreover, facial mimicry can also influence perceived power:
people who mimic more in an interaction are perceived as more
likeable (van Baaren et al., 2009) and therefore may be less dom-
inant because likeability (Farley, 2008) and agreeableness (Lippa
and Arad, 1999) are negatively related to perceived dominance.
Yet other paradigms might require mentalizing skills to a
higher degree. In a paper by Galinsky et al. (2006, Study 1) partic-
ipants were asked to draw an E on their foreheads right before a
live interaction with a partner. Powerful people were less likely
to draw the letter by taking the perspective of the interaction
partner. Even though perspective taking is not a measure of EA
per se, it has been suggested as a mechanism through which
power might hamper accuracy in social judgments. Perspective
taking can be considered a more inferential type of thinking
and might therefore rely mostly on mentalizing skills. Muscatell
et al. (2012) found that lower social status was related to greater
activity in the mentalizing system while encoding social informa-
tion. This might explain why low power people engage more in
perspective-taking strategies than high power people.
In many of the studies that use experimental manipulation
of power, participants are asked to recall autobiographical events
related to power (Galinsky et al., 2006; Schmid Mast et al., 2009).
With this type of priming, the strategy participants use to recall
the events is not controlled, which may represent a confounding
factor. Some participants might choose spontaneously to focus
on contextual information of the recalled event, a strategy that
would foster mentalizing skills and advantage those participants
in subsequent tasks requiring inferential reasoning (e.g., perspec-
tive taking). This idea is supported by a neuroimaging study by
Morelli et al. (2012), which shows that focusing on the con-
text of an emotional event involves the mentalizing system more
than the mirroring system. Instead, people focusing more on
their own bodily sensations (e.g., the stress of being powerless)
might elicit a mirroring response and therefore be more accurate
in a subsequent task requiring mirroring (e.g., simple emotion
recognition).
Taken together, differences in the tasks used to assess EA and
to manipulate power might contribute to explain the contrasting
finding concerning their relationship.
HOW POWERMAY INFLUENCE MENTALIZING
Construal Level Theory (CLT; Liberman and Trope, 1998) draws
on the concept of psychological distance. Distal entities (e.g.,
events far in time or space or hypothetical) are more remote
from direct experience and therefore need a higher level of con-
strual (i.e., the missing information needs to be taken from more
proximal entities). CLT makes specific predictions about power
and these have also been taken up by the social distance model
of power by Magee and Smith (2013). Powerful people should
feel more psychological distance and more dissimilar to power-
less individuals (Liberman et al., 2007; Magee and Smith, 2013).
Indeed a study by Lammers et al. (2012) provided support for
this hypothesis by showing that high power primed people were
less willing to collaborate with a social partner on a series of
games than low power people. There is evidence that when peo-
ple are judging targets similar to them, a more ventral region in
the medial PFC is activated compared to when people are judg-
ing targets that are less similar to them (Mitchell et al., 2006). If
high power people perceive low power targets as less similar to
them, they might show reduced activation in the ventral medial
PFC region, but increased activation in the more dorsal region
identified by Mitchell et al. (2006), which correspond to an area
typically involved in mentalizing. To the extent that the social dis-
tance between high and low power individuals increases, the high
power individuals might therefore rely more on mentalizing skills
to correctly assess others’ thoughts and feelings.
It could also be argued that powerless people rely more on
mentalizing than powerful people. Fiske’s continuum model of
power (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990; Goodwin et al., 2000) predicts
that low power people focus their attention on high power peo-
ple, whereas the latter are more self-focused. A meta-analysis by
Denny et al. (2012) showed that a more ventral region of the
medial PFC is associated with self-related judgments, whereas
a more dorsal region is related to judgments about others. The
dmPFC activation suggests mentalizing and indeed its activity
is greater in low than high social status people when encoding
social information (Muscatell et al., 2012). Further experimen-
tal research is therefore necessary in order to specifically test the
effects of power on mentalizing.
HOW POWERMAY INFLUENCE MIRRORING
Studies on facial mimicry can support the hypothesis of an
influence of power on mirroring. Theories of embodied cog-
nition claim that emotion recognition is achieved through an
internal simulation of the perceived expression (Goldman and
Sripada, 2005; Niedenthal et al., 2010). Even though mimicry
might not be strictly necessary for emotion recognition (Hess and
Blairy, 2001; Sander et al., 2007; Rives Bogart and Matsumoto,
2010; Mumenthaler and Sander, 2012), mimicry responses pre-
dict the perceived intensity of facial expressions (Sato et al.,
2013). Moreover, interfering with mimicry can hamper emotion
recognition accuracy (Oberman et al., 2007; Neal and Chartrand,
2011). Research on mimicry is important if we consider that high
power individuals tend to be more expressive than low power
people in live interactions (Snodgrass et al., 1998). Hsee et al.
(1990) found that powerful individuals are more likely to display
subordinate’s feelings than vice versa. These findings suggest that
high power people might engage the mirroring system to a higher
degree than low power people when reading others’ minds and
this might explain their high accuracy on facial expression recog-
nition tests (Schmid Mast et al., 2009, Study 3). In addition, one
could argue that low power people mimic less because they might
havemore negative mood or attitudes (e.g., toward superiors) and
this is known to reduce the mimicry response (Likowski et al.,
2011). Again, further experimental research is necessary in order
to test the effects of power on mirroring.
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POWER AND FLEXIBILITY
Hirsh et al. (2011) proposed a model that draws on Keltner
et al. (2003) explanations of approach and inhibition. According
to these authors, powerful people would be more approach-
oriented. This would activate the Behavioral Approach System,
which in turn would decrease the conflict between compet-
ing responses (i.e., disinhibition). Thus, powerful people would
behave according to their most salient response, which can be
externally driven, when strong contextual cues are present, or
internally driven, in absence of such cues. When the response is
internally triggered, power can reveal the internal dispositions of
the person. When there are strong contextual cues, Hirsh et al.’s
model predicts that powerful people will be more responsive to
the affordances required by the task. This is in accordance with
the Situated Focus Theory by Guinote (2007), which posits that
power fosters the attunement to the situation and increases flex-
ibility. Thus, this suggests that powerful people may be more
able to switch flexibly between mentalizing and mirroring skills,
according to what is more relevant to task demands.
CONCLUSIONS
Whereas current models of power do not seem to properly
account for the heterogeneity found in the literature on the
power-EA link, in the present paper we speculate that a focus
on the differential role of mirroring vs. mentalizing could. This
approach can guide future research in at least two directions.
First, empirical studies might test specific hypotheses based on
the mechanisms we propose here. We expect that the ambivalent
effects of power on EA will be teased apart once the effects of mir-
roring and mentalizing on power and EA are taken into account.
Second, future studies might be more cautious in the choice of
the specific EA tasks. Indeed, assessing EA through tasks focus-
ing mostly on mirroring or on mentalizing might dramatically
influence the outcomes of a study.
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